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THE CAT IS ALREADY OUT OF THE BAG: RESOLVING 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE DANGEROUS PATIENT 
EXCEPTION TO THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST–PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
Blake R. Hills* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario in which a psychotherapist1 is treating a patient
who has a criminal history that includes multiple convictions for 
violent offenses.2  During a therapy session, the patient tells their 
psychotherapist that the federal judge from their last case is “gonna 
pay for what he did to me.”  The psychotherapist warns the 
authorities, and everything is fine for a while, but the judge is 
subsequently found beaten to death.  There is enough circumstantial 
evidence to charge the patient with the murder of the judge, but the 
case is not especially strong.  In order to shore up its case, the 
prosecution seeks to have the psychotherapist testify at trial about the 
threat.  Is there a privilege that prevents psychotherapists from 
testifying against their clients in a criminal trial?3  If there is a 
general privilege, is there an exception for dangerous patients?4  
The Supreme Court declared that there is a psychotherapist–patient 
privilege in Jaffee v. Redmond.5  Unfortunately, the Court did not 
address whether there is a dangerous patient exception to the 
privilege.6  This has led to a split between the circuits with varying 
answers about the existence of an exception.7  The resulting system 
of rules that depends on location is a significant problem that should 
* Prosecuting Attorney, Summit County Utah Attorney’s Office.  J.D., S.J. Quinney
University of Utah College of Law (1998).  The views and opinions expressed in this
article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Summit County Attorney’s Office.
1. See What Is a Psychotherapist? Types of Psychotherapy, HEALTH COMMUNITY (Jan.
21, 2002), http://www.healthcommunities.com/mental-health-care/what-is-psychother
apist-psychotherapy.shtml [https://perma.cc/CT4R-95VV].
2. See infra notes 168–76 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See infra notes 71–82 and accompanying text.
5. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
6. See infra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
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be fixed by the Supreme Court.8  The fact that “more than half of all 
prison and jail inmates ha[ve] a mental health problem” demonstrates 
that this is a problem that will persist until it is addressed by the 
Court.9 
This Article proceeds in several parts.  Part II discusses the general 
principles regarding privileges.10  Part III details a history of the rules 
surrounding psychotherapist–patient communications.11  Part IV 
examines the Jaffee decision and discusses what the Supreme Court 
did and did not say about the psychotherapist–patient privilege and a 
possible dangerous patient exception.12  Part V surveys the split of 
authority amongst the federal circuit courts.13  Part VI suggests that 
the Court should be guided by policy to hold that there is a dangerous 
patient exception to the psychotherapist–patient privilege.14  Finally, 
Part VII proposes a procedure for courts to use when determining 
whether the dangerous patient exception is applicable in a particular 
case.15 
II. PRIVILEGES IN GENERAL
For at least the last three hundred years, it has been “a fundamental
maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.”16  
Because testimonial exclusionary privileges contravene that 
fundamental principle, “they must be strictly construed and accepted 
‘only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or 
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the 
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining truth.’”17  Indeed, privileges “are not lightly created nor 
8. See infra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES 1 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JCV-Z8M9].  The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that during
one sample year, “more than half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health
problem, including 705,600 inmates in State prisons, 78,800 in Federal prisons, and
479,900 in local jails.”  Id.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See infra Part VII.
16. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (citing WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192
(3d ed. 1940)).
17. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for 
truth.”18 
“Privileges are justified by the need to protect the privacy of 
certain relationships and the need to encourage open communications 
within these relationships.”19  Essentially, privileges are justified 
when “the social cost of protecting these relationships far outweighs 
the testimonial benefits.”20  There are four conditions that must be 
met to satisfy this standard: 
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.21
The earliest recognized privilege was the attorney–client privilege 
under Roman law.22  This was also the first privilege to be 
recognized under the common law of England during the reign of 
Elizabeth I.23  However, in 1776, the House of Lords rejected the 
idea that there was a physician–patient privilege under the common 
law in the Duchess of Kingston’s Case.24  In the United States, the 
physician–patient privilege was first recognized by statute in New 
York in 1828.25 
18. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
19. Deborah Paruch, From Trusted Confidant to Witness for the Prosecution: The Case
Against the Recognition of a Dangerous-Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 327, 331 (2011).
20. Deborah C. Edwards, Note, Duty-to-Warn Even if It May Be Hearsay? The
Implications of a Psychotherapist’s Duty-to-Warn a Third Person When Information
Is Obtained from Someone Other than His Patient, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 171, 173
(2006).
21. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
22. Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional
Secret, 39 SW. L.J. 661, 667 (1985).
23. Id. at 669–70.
24. Id. at 671; see also Rex. v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 572–73 (1776).
25. Id. at 676; see also N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3, § 73 (1829).
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III. HISTORY OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST–PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
There was no psychotherapist–patient privilege under the common 
law.26  This is not surprising, as psychiatry was not fully developed 
until well into the twentieth century.27  The first case on record to 
recognize the privilege was the Illinois Circuit Court case of Binder 
v. Ruvell in 1952.28  In that civil case, a psychiatrist and a hospital
were both summoned to produce the medical records of a recent
patient.29  The court ruled that the information provided by a patient
to a psychiatrist during psychotherapy sessions was protected from
disclosure even though Illinois did not recognize a physician–patient
privilege at that time.30  In determining that Illinois law should
recognize this privilege, the court concluded that the protection of the
confidences that arise in the psychotherapist–patient relationship
outweighed the “correct disposal of a particular case.”31
Once other states began to recognize the privilege, it gained 
widespread acceptance fairly quickly.32  For instance, forty-five 
states recognized some form of the privilege by 1985.33  By 1996, the 
District of Columbia and all fifty states enacted some form of the 
privilege.34   
Federal courts were not as quick to give the psychotherapist–
patient privilege widespread acceptance.35  In 1972, the Supreme 
Court submitted proposed rules of evidence to Congress that would 
have recognized nine federal privileges, including a psychotherapist–
patient privilege.36  Proposed Rule 504 provided in part: 
26. Molly E. Slaughter, Note, Misuse of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
Weisbeck v. Hess: A Step Backward in the Prohibition of Sexual Exploitation of a
Patient by a Psychotherapist, 41 S.D. L. REV. 574, 588 (1996).
27. Major Dru Brenner-Beck, “Shrinking” the Right to Everyman’s Evidence: Jaffee in
the Military, 45 A.F. L. REV. 201, 208 (1998).
28. See Edwards, supra note 20, at 176.
29. Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 24, 1952), reported in 150 JAMA
1165, 1241 (1952).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 1242.
32. See Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications: Medical and Counseling
Privileges, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1539 (1985).
33. Id.
34. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996).
35. See infra notes 36–51 and accompanying text.
36. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 231,
240–42 (1972).
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(b) General Rule of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications, made for the
purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or
emotional condition, including drug addiction, among
himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the
direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the
patient’s family.37
The proposed rule contained exceptions to the privilege for (1) 
communications made pursuant to proceedings to hospitalize a 
patient, (2) communications made in connection with court-ordered 
examinations, or (3) communications relevant to an issue of the 
mental or emotional condition when the condition is relied upon as 
an element of the claim or defense.38  
The timing of this proposed rule was unfortunate; it was submitted 
while the Watergate scandal was unfolding.39  The battle between 
Congress and the President over executive privilege contributed 
towards “an enormous outcry” against the privilege provisions of the 
proposed rules.40  As a result of the controversy, Congress chose to 
jettison all of the proposed privileges and enacted Rule 501 as the 
single rule of privilege.41  Rule 501 simply provides that “[t]he 
common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of 
reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege” in the absence 
of a provision in the Constitution, statutes, or rules.42  In rejecting 
specific privilege rules and only adopting a general rule, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee stated that it was not against the recognition of 
specific privileges such as: 
Psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife, or any other of the 
enumerated privileges contained in the Supreme Court rules. 
Rather, our action should be understood as reflecting the 
view that the recognition of a privilege based on a 
37. Id. at 241.
38. Id.
39. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the
Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 512 (1994).
40. Id. at 513.
41. See id. at 514.
42. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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confidential relationship and other privileges should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.43 
Unsurprisingly, the contentious background and vague language of 
Rule 501 led to confusion about whether there was a 
psychotherapist–patient privilege in federal court proceedings.44  The 
Second,45 Sixth,46 and Seventh47 Circuits recognized the privilege.  
However, the Fifth,48 Ninth,49 Tenth,50 and Eleventh51 Circuits 
declined to do so. 
IV. JAFFEE V. REDMOND
The Supreme Court finally addressed the existence of the
psychotherapist–patient privilege in the federal courts in Jaffee v. 
Redmond.52  That case began when Officer Mary Lu Redmond 
responded to a call regarding a fight in progress at an apartment 
complex.53  Although there were differing accounts of what happened 
at the scene, it was undisputed that Redmond shot and killed Ricky 
Allen shortly after she arrived.54  Jaffee, the administrator of Allen’s 
estate, subsequently filed suit in federal court, alleging that Redmond 
violated Allen’s constitutional rights by using excessive force.55   
During pretrial discovery, Jaffee learned that Redmond participated 
in approximately fifty counseling sessions with a licensed clinical 
social worker.56  Jaffee sought access to the social worker’s notes 
about Redmond’s counseling sessions, but this attempt was 
“vigorously resisted” with an assertion that the notes were protected 
by the psychotherapist privilege.57  The district court rejected this 
43. Edwards, supra note 20, at 175–76.
44. See infra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
45. In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992).
46. In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 1983).
47. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
48. United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir. 1976).
49. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989).
50. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994).
51. United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1988).
52. Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 4–5.  Redmond testified that she shot Allen when it appeared that he was about
to stab another man with a butcher knife, while members of Allen’s family who were
at the scene testified that Allen was unarmed.  Id.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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argument, but Redmond and the social worker both refused to 
disclose the contents of the notes and refused to answer questions 
about their conversations during depositions.58  At the end of trial, 
the judge instructed the jury that there was no legal justification for 
the refusal to turn over the notes and permitted the jury to presume 
that the contents would have been unfavorable to Redmond.59  The 
jury awarded Allen’s estate $500,000 on the state claim and $45,000 
on the federal claim.60 
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial.61  The 
court concluded that the “reason and experience” factors of Rule 501 
required the recognition of the psychotherapist–patient privilege.62  
The court explained that “[r]eason tells us that psychotherapists and 
patients share a unique relationship, in which the ability to 
communicate freely without the fear of public disclosure is the key to 
successful treatment,” and “[a]s to experience, . . . all 50 States have 
adopted some form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.”63  
However, the court stated that the privilege “would not apply if, ‘in 
the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for the disclosure of the 
contents of a patient’s counseling sessions outweighs that patient’s 
privacy interests.’”64 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that although the 
general rule does not favor testimonial privileges, exceptions may be 
justified when a “public good transcending the normally predominant 
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”65  The 
Court then found that “reason and experience” dictate that a 
psychotherapist–patient privilege “promotes sufficiently important 
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.”66  The 
privilege would promote the private interest of the patient by 
facilitating an “atmosphere of confidence and trust.”67  Thus, the 
privilege is necessary because “the mere possibility of disclosure 
may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary 
for successful treatment.”68  However, it is not enough that a 
58. Id.
59. Id. at 5–6.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995)).
63. Id. (quoting Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355–56).
64. Id. at 7 (quoting Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357).
65. Id. at 9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
66. Id. at 9–10 (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51).
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id.
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privilege serves a private interest; “an asserted privilege must also 
‘serv[e] public ends.’”69  The Court stated that the privilege would 
benefit the public at large “by facilitating the provision of appropriate 
treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or 
emotional problem.”70 
After holding that Rule 501 did provide for a psychotherapist–
patient privilege, the Court was faced with defining the contours of 
the privilege.71  The Court expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit’s 
balancing test because “[m]aking the promise of confidentiality 
contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of the relative 
importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary 
need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the 
privilege.”72  Instead, the Court held that “confidential 
communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients 
in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from compelled 
disclosure.”73  The Court then explained that the privilege applies 
equally to licensed psychologists, psychiatrists, and clinical social 
workers.74   
Although this appeared to be a bright-line rule, the Court expressly 
declined to “delineate its full contours in a way that would ‘govern 
all conceivable future questions in this area.’”75  Instead, the Court 
stated that the details of the privilege should be determined on a case-
by-case basis.76  Most importantly, the Court stated in a footnote that: 
Although it would be premature to speculate about most 
future developments in the federal psychotherapist 
privilege, we do not doubt that there are situations in which 
the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat 
of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by 
means of a disclosure by the therapist.77 
69. Id. at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 15.
74. Id. at 15–17.
75. Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 18 n.19.
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This footnote created a split among the circuits about whether there 
is a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist–patient 
privilege. 
V. CIRCUIT SPLIT
It is not surprising that, left on their own, the circuit courts have
taken varying positions on whether there is a dangerous patient 
exception.78  Currently, one circuit recognizes the dangerous patient 
exception,79 three do not,80 and one relies on the doctrine of waiver.81  
In the circuits that have not yet picked a side, the district courts have 
recognized the exception.82 
A. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit became the first circuit to address the dangerous
patient exception in United States v. Glass.83  That case began when 
the defendant was voluntarily admitted to the mental health unit of a 
hospital for treatment of his “ongoing mental illness.”84  While he 
was in the hospital, the defendant told his psychotherapist that he 
wanted to “get in the history books” like the man who shot Ronald 
Reagan and that he wanted to shoot President Clinton and Mrs. 
Clinton.85  The defendant was subsequently released from the 
hospital after he agreed to participate in outpatient therapy and live 
with his father.86  Shortly thereafter, a nurse notified law enforcement 
after discovering that the defendant had left his father’s home.87  As a 
consequence, the Secret Service contacted the psychotherapist and 
learned about the defendant’s statements.88 
The defendant was subsequently charged with knowingly and 
willingly threatening to kill the President of the United States.89  The 
defendant moved to exclude the statements he made to his 
psychotherapist on the ground that these were confidential 
78. See infra Sections V.A–E.
79. See infra Section V.A.
80. See infra Sections V.B–D.
81. See infra Section V.E.
82. See infra Section V.F.
83. United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1357 (10th Cir. 1998).





89. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994)).
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communications protected by the psychotherapist–patient privilege.90  
In response, the prosecution argued that the statements were 
admissible because they fell within the exception of footnote 19 of 
Jaffee.91  The district court agreed with the prosecution and 
determined that when there is “an express threat to kill a third party 
by a person with an established history of mental disorder” the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege is inapplicable.92 
The Tenth Circuit held that even though Jaffee was a civil case, the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege also applied in criminal cases.93  
Although the court did not expressly use the words “dangerous 
patient exception,” the court found that footnote 19 did allow for 
such an exception.94  Specifically, the court held that an exception to 
the privilege exists when “the threat was serious when it was uttered 
and . . . its disclosure was the only means of averting harm to the 
[victim] when the disclosure was made.”95  However, the court was 
unable to determine whether these two requirements were met based 
on the record before it, so it remanded the case for additional factual 
findings.96 
B. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit addressed the potential of a dangerous patient
exception in United States v. Hayes.97  In that case, the defendant was 
an employee of the Postal Service who had behaved erratically at 
work.98  After having several of these erratic episodes, the defendant 
sought treatment at a Veterans Administration hospital.99  During 
treatment, the defendant told his psychotherapist that he wanted to 
kill his supervisor and that he was only able to resist this desire 
because he recognized that doing so would jeopardize his continued 
employment.100  The defendant was released from the hospital but 
readmitted himself a few days later.101  The defendant repeated his 
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1359–60.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1360.
96. Id.
97. United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
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homicidal desires, but the doctors concluded that he could control 
himself and released him from the hospital with a prescription for 
psychotropic medication.102  A few weeks later, the defendant met 
with a social worker and detailed his plan to kill his supervisor.103  
After the defendant gave even more details about his plan in a 
subsequent meeting with the social worker, the social worker warned 
the supervisor.104   
After the plan was reported, the Postal Inspector obtained the 
defendant’s medical records, and the defendant was charged with 
threatening to kill a federal official.105  The defendant moved to 
dismiss the indictment and to suppress his medical records, including 
any testimony from his psychotherapists based on the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege.106  The district court ruled that the 
records and testimony were privileged and granted the motion to 
suppress.107 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that 
psychotherapists have a duty under state law to warn a foreseeable 
victim if a patient poses a serious danger of violence.108  However, 
the court saw no connection between a therapist’s duty to notify a 
third person of a patient’s threat and the psychotherapist–patient 
privilege.109  The court then identified three reasons for rejecting a 
dangerous patient exception to the privilege.110  First, the exception 
“would have a deleterious effect on the ‘atmosphere of confidence 
and trust’ in the psychotherapist/patient relationship.”111  Second, 
even though allowing a psychotherapist to testify “serv[es] [a] public 
end,” the benefits are outweighed by the need to improve the mental 
health of the general public.112  Third, the fact that the majority of 
states had not adopted a dangerous patient exception indicated that 




105. Id. at 580–81.
106. Id. at 581.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 583.
109. Id. at 583–84.
110. Id. at 584–86.
111. Id. at 584.
112. Id. at 585 (alterations in original).
113. Id. at 585–86.
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Therefore, the court declined to recognize a dangerous patient 
exception.114 
C. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit addressed the possible existence of a dangerous
patient exception in United States v. Ghane.115  The case began when 
the defendant, who had a documented history of mental illness, called 
a suicide hotline and reported that he was suicidal.116  The defendant 
was then transported to the hospital, where he reported that if he were 
to commit suicide, he would use the cyanide that he had at his 
apartment.117  After receiving consent from the defendant to search 
his apartment, the police found and seized the cyanide.118 
The defendant was admitted to the psychiatric ward where he was 
treated by a clinical psychiatrist.119  During an examination, the 
defendant told the psychiatrist that he was suicidal, that he had 
thoughts of harming other people who were associated with the 
Corps of Engineers, and that he had access to chemicals.120  After 
obtaining the defendant’s consent, the psychiatrist reported the 
threats to law enforcement.121  The defendant was subsequently 
charged with stockpiling, retaining, and possessing a chemical 
weapon.122  The psychiatrist was allowed to testify at trial after the 
district court ruled that such testimony was admissible under a 
dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist–patient 
privilege.123 
The Eighth Circuit held that footnote 19 of Jaffee did not establish 
a dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist–patient 
privilege.124  In so holding, the court adopted the reasoning of 
Hayes.125  First, the court found no connection between the duty to 
report threats under state law and the application of the privilege in 
114. Id. at 586.  The court stated that a psychotherapist could testify against a patient in a
hearing related to the involuntary hospitalization of the patient.  Id.
115. United States v. Ghane, 673 F.3d 771, 779–86 (8th Cir. 2012).
116. Id. at 775.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 775–76.
119. Id. at 776.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 775.
123. Id. at 784.
124. Id. at 784–85.
125. Id. at 785.
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criminal proceedings.126  Second, the court indicated that a dangerous 
patient exception would have a “deleterious effect on the ‘confidence 
and trust’ the Supreme Court held is implicit in the confidential 
relationship between the therapist and a patient.”127  Thus, the court 
did not adopt the dangerous patient exception in the Eighth Circuit.128 
D. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit addressed the potential of a dangerous patient
exception in United States v. Chase.129  That case involved a 
defendant who received treatment from a psychiatrist and a 
psychologist for irritability, depression, and anger.130  During a series 
of counseling sessions and a phone call, the defendant told his 
psychiatrist that he was planning to kill FBI agents.131  The defendant 
stated during one counseling session that if a lien against his house 
was not dropped “he would get his guns, get in his vehicle and have 
himself some justice,” and “he had gathered more information on the 
people he intended to kill and that he had located all but four of those 
on his list.”132  The psychiatrist reported the threats.133  After the FBI 
made plans to interview the defendant and search his home, the 
defendant called the psychiatrist’s clinic and spoke with telephone 
operators, whom he told that “there are FBI Marshals that are on their 
way out to get me and if that happens, people are going to die.”134 
The defendant was arrested and charged with threatening to murder 
FBI and other law enforcement officials.135  The defendant claimed 
that his psychiatrist could not testify about his statements, but the 
district court held that the testimony was admissible.136  The district 
court found that the psychotherapist–patient privilege did not apply 
because the psychiatrist had properly determined that the threats were 
serious when uttered, that harm was imminent, and that disclosure 
was the only way to prevent the harm.137  A three-judge panel of the 
126. Id. (quoting United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2000)).
127. Id. (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996)).
128. Id. at 786.  The court did state that a psychotherapist could testify against a patient in
a hearing related to the involuntary hospitalization of the patient.  Id. at 785–86.
129. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
130. Id. at 979.
131. Id. at 979–80.
132. Id. at 980.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 981.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, but the full court 
decided to rehear the case en banc.138 
The full Ninth Circuit began its analysis by distinguishing between 
the duty to disclose the threats under state law and the testimonial 
privilege.139  The court interpreted footnote 19 of Jaffee to endorse 
the duty to disclose threats to the intended victim.140  However, the 
court found that there were several reasons for not recognizing a 
dangerous patient exception.141   
First, the court found that a federal exception to the privilege 
“would weaken state confidentiality laws” because all but one of the 
states in the circuit had laws with a distinction between the duty to 
disclose and the testimonial privilege.142  Next, the court stated that 
while the duty to disclose threats to the victim had obvious benefits 
that outweighed the cost of the effect on the psychotherapist–patient 
relationship, subsequent testimony at a trial did not if the patient was 
no longer dangerous at the time of trial.143  In addition, the court 
found that because Proposed Rule 504 did not contain a dangerous 
patient exception, that fact weighed against recognizing such an 
exception.144  Finally, the court concluded that the benefits derived 
from refusing to recognize the exception far outweighed any 
evidentiary gain resulting from the compelled testimony because of 
the “deleterious effect” that abrogation of the privilege would have 
on the therapeutic relationship.145 
E. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit had the opportunity to address a dangerous
patient exception in United States v. Auster but ultimately resolved 
the issues in the case on waiver grounds.146  In that case, the 
defendant was a retired police officer who received workers’ 
compensation benefits for close to two decades.147  The defendant 
was also treated for paranoia, anger, and depression for a number of 
138. Id.
139. Id. at 985.
140. Id. at 984 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).
141. See id. at 985–92.
142. Id. at 985–86.
143. Id. at 987.
144. See id. at 990.
145. Id. at 990–91 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2000)).
146. See United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2008).
147. Id. at 313.
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years.148  During his therapy sessions, the defendant made numerous 
threats of violence directed towards the managers of his workers’ 
compensation claim.149  His therapists reported the threats.150  When 
the company managing the defendant’s claim subsequently told him 
that it would stop paying a portion of his claim, the defendant made 
specific threats during therapy directed towards the company’s 
personnel, city authorities, and police officials.151 The defendant 
stated that he had “stockpiles of weapons and supplies to provide the 
basis for his actions.”152 
After these specific threats, the therapist warned the benefits 
company, and one of the employees contacted the police.153  The 
defendant was arrested and was subsequently charged with 
extortion.154  The defendant moved to suppress the communications 
between himself and his therapist based on the psychotherapist–
patient privilege.155  The district court granted the motion and the 
government appealed.156 
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by noting that under Jaffee, the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege only applies to confidential 
communications.157  The court noted that the fundamental rule of 
privilege is that “[t]he communications must originate in a 
confidence that they will not be disclosed.”158  “[W]ithout such a 
reasonable expectation [of confidentiality,] there is no privilege.”159  
The court explained that the operative test is “whether there was a 
‘reasonable expectation of confidentiality’ when the statement was 
made.”160  The court also noted that the requirement of 
confidentiality is clear from Jaffee’s express statement that “[l]ike 
other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the 
protection.”161  With this context in mind, the court held that because 
148. Id.
149. See id. at 313–14.
150. See id. at 313 & n.2, 314.





156. See id. at 313–14.
157. See id. at 315 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996)).
158. Id. at 315 n.6 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 72 (6th ed. 2006)).
159. Id. at 316.
160. Id. at 317.
161. Id. at 318 n.17 (quoting Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 n.14).
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the defendant knew when he made the threat that it would be reported 
to the benefits company, the psychotherapist–patient privilege did not 
apply as a matter of law “because he had no reasonable basis to 
conclude that the statement was confidential.”162   
Because the psychotherapist–patient privilege did not apply to the 
defendant’s non-confidential statement, the court stated that it was 
unnecessary to determine whether there is a dangerous patient 
exception.163  However, the court stated that footnote 19 of Jaffee 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court views the psychotherapist–
patient privilege to be limited in scope.164   “Moreover, because the 
Court contemplated that the privilege must give way in some 
instances involving dangerous patients, even where there is 
confidentiality, it follows a fortiori that the privilege is inapplicable 
in similar situations involving dangerous patients where there is no 
confidentiality.”165 
F. District Courts
There are some circuits that have not addressed the existence of a
dangerous patient exception to the psychotherapist–patient 
privilege.166  However, some district courts in those circuits have 
addressed the issue.167 
The United States District Court for the District of Maine 
addressed this issue in United States v. Hardy.168  In that case, the 
defendant had a history of mental illness and a criminal history that 
included convictions for violent offenses.169  In May of 2008, the 
defendant went to the emergency room of a hospital “complaining of 
either high blood pressure or a blood sugar issue.”170  During his 
initial assessment, the defendant threatened to kill the President by 
cutting his head off and shooting him.171  This threat was reported to 
the Secret Service, and the defendant was transferred to another 
hospital for psychiatric evaluation.172  While at the second hospital, 
162. Id. at 315.
163. See id. at 321.
164. Id. at 315 n.5 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 168–93 and accompanying text.
168. Unitd States v. Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79–80 (D. Me. 2009).
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the defendant told his treating psychiatrist that he was going to kill 
the President, a former president, and a senator.173  These threats 
were also reported to the Secret Service.174 
The defendant was subsequently charged with making a threat 
against the President of the United States.175  The defendant 
contended that the statements he made in the hospitals were protected 
by the psychotherapist–patient privilege.176 
The court began its analysis by noting that the statements fell under 
the psychotherapist–patient privilege, but under footnote 19 of Jaffee, 
there are times when the privilege must give way.177  The court then 
briefly recited the holdings of Glass and Hayes and stated that it 
found the rationale of Glass to be more persuasive in light of footnote 
19’s suggestion “that the privilege must give way to a serious threat 
of harm.”178  Thus, the court found that the statements were 
admissible under the dangerous patient exception to the privilege.179 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida addressed this issue in United States v. Highsmith.180  In that 
case, the defendant voluntarily admitted himself into a Veteran’s 
Administration hospital because of homicidal and suicidal 
thoughts.181  Two days later, the defendant told a staff psychiatrist 
that he had a gun at home which he intended to use to kill an 
administrative law judge and then kill himself.182  The defendant 
repeated these threats over the next two days, and the psychiatrist 
notified law enforcement about the threats.183 
The defendant was subsequently charged with threatening to kill an 
administrative law judge.184  The defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the statements he made to his psychiatrist based on the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege.185  The prosecution recognized the 
173. See id. at 78.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 76.  This statute prohibits “knowingly and willfully” making a threat against
the President, Vice-President, and other elected officials.  18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2012).
176. See Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
177. See id. at 78–79 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).
178. Id. at 80.
179. See id.
180. See United States v. Highsmith, No. 07-80093-CR, 2007 WL 2406990 (S.D. Fla. Aug.
20, 2007).




185. See id. at *1, *2.
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privilege but argued that the statements fell within the dangerous 
patient exception.186  The defendant argued that there was no such 
exception in federal court.187 
The court began its analysis by quoting the language of footnote 19 
of Jaffee.188  The court acknowledged that there was a split among 
the circuits on the meaning of footnote 19 and then concluded “that 
footnote 19 in Jaffee was an acknowledgment of the existence of a 
narrow exception to the psychotherapist–patient privilege.”189 
Further, the court concluded that the footnote “cannot be read as 
merely recognizing the duty of a psychotherapist to warn third parties 
of potential danger or to testify in civil commitment proceedings.”190  
In addition, the court stated that the Supreme Court’s “use of the 
word privilege in a testimonial context cannot be construed to refer to 
either a duty which state law might impose on a therapist, or an 
authorization which state law might bestow on a therapist, to warn of 
potential harm to the patient or third parties.”191  Thus, the court held 
that there is a dangerous patient exception that allows a 
psychotherapist to “testify about confidential communications 
received from a patient ‘if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to 
others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the 
therapist.’”192  However, the court concluded that the defendant’s 
statements did not fall under the dangerous patient exception because 
the exception requires a showing “that a serious threat of harm can be 
averted only by means of disclosure” and because the defendant was 
in a locked psychiatric unit, disclosure was not the only way to 
prevent harm to the judge.193 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD EXPRESSLY
RECOGNIZE THE DANGEROUS PATIENT EXCEPTION TO
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST–PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The failure of the Supreme Court in Jaffee to specifically address 
the existence of a dangerous patient exception to the 
psychotherapist–patient privilege has led to a confused mixture of 
186. See id. at *2.
187. See id.
188. See id. (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).
189. Id.




193. See id. at *3.
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rules that depend on where a trial occurs.194  Different outcomes for 
identical facts based merely on the location of the court is very 
unfair.195  This situation is untenable in a modern age when crimes 
frequently cross jurisdictional boundaries.196  The time has come for 
the Supreme Court to expressly recognize that there is a dangerous 
patient exception to the psychotherapist–patient privilege in federal 
court proceedings.197 
A. The Tarasoff Duty to Report
Any discussion of the dangerous patient exception must begin with
a recognition that psychotherapists already have a statutory duty 
under state law to report serious threats of harm made by patients 
under their care.198  This duty is generally referred to as the Tarasoff 
duty, which had its origin in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California.199 
194. See supra Part V.
195. See Unfairness, CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary
/english/unfairness [https://perma.cc/T4KB-VJWS] (last visited Dec. 26, 2019)
(“[T]he quality or fact of not treating people in an equal way, or of being morally
wrong.”).
196. See Cynthia Burke, Cross-Jurisdictional Task Forces on the Border: Targeting Drugs
and Violence in San Diego County, SANDAG 3 (Feb. 2014), sandag.org/uploads/public
ationid/publicationid_1823_17169.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV5G-AFBY] (“Criminal
activity . . . often crosses jurisdictional boundaries . . . .”); see Brian A. Jackson et al.,
Knowing More, but Accomplishing What? Developing Approaches to Measure the
Effects of Information-Sharing on Criminal Justice Outcomes, SEMANTIC SCHOLAR
13, pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4da0/a16bd9e8ce8325489f88722a4cf6883009cb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LM5Z-2Z6W] (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) (explaining that “criminal
activity can cross jurisdictional boundaries”).
197. See infra notes 198–214 and accompanying text.
198. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (imposing
a duty to control anyone foreseeably endangered by a patient); see Hamman v. County
of Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989) (explaining that a foreseeable victim
is anyone “within the zone of danger, that is, subject to probable risk of the patient’s
violent conduct”); see Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072–73 (Del. 1988) (holding
that a psychiatrist has a duty to warn the general public, which could have been
injured as a result of an automobile accident with the psychotic patient); see Bardoni
v. Kim, 390 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (finding a duty to warn an
identifiable victim).
199. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976); see also
United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Some of these exceptions
allow, and some require, a psychotherapist to disclose threats made by a patient
during therapeutic sessions if the psychotherapist determines that the patient poses a
risk of serious harm to self or others.  This exception is often referred to as the
Tarasoff duty . . . .”); see also Romar v. Fresno Cmty. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 583 F.
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In 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff two months after 
he “confided his intention to kill Tatiana” to his psychologist at the 
Cowell Memorial Hospital at the University of California at 
Berkeley.200  Specifically, Poddar told his psychologist during 
outpatient treatment that “he was going to kill an unnamed girl, 
readily identifiable as Tatiana, when she returned home from 
spending the summer in Brazil.”201  The psychologist decided that 
Poddar should be committed for observation so he asked campus 
police for assistance in confining Poddar.202  The police took Poddar 
into custody but released him after he promised to stay away from 
Tatiana.203  Neither the psychologist nor the police warned Tatiana or 
her family that she was in any danger, and she was murdered by 
Poddar two months later.204  Tatiana’s parents subsequently filed suit, 
asserting various claims based on the failure to warn and protect 
Tatiana.205 
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that 
there is a special relationship between a psychotherapist and a 
patient.206  Because of this special relationship, the court held that, 
“When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his 
profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious 
danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use 
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such 
danger.”207  Depending on the nature of the case, this duty may 
require the psychotherapist to “warn the intended victim or others 
likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to 
take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances.”208  The court concluded that: 
[T]he public policy favoring protection of the confidential
character of patient-psychotherapist communications must
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert
Supp. 2d 1179, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“The duty of a psychotherapist to warn a third 
party victim was created by the California Supreme Court in Tarasoff . . . .”). 
200. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339.
201. Id. at 341.
202. See id.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 339, 341.
205. See id. at 340–41
206. See id. at 343.
207. Id. at 340.
208. Id.
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danger to others.  The protective privilege ends where the 
public peril begins. 
 . . . In this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate the 
further exposure to danger that would result from a 
concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was 
lethal.  If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the 
threatened victim requires the therapist to warn the 
endangered party or those who can reasonably be expected 
to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that 
would protect and justify concealment.209 
Because Tarasoff ignited a trend of legislation, the majority of 
states imposed a Tarasoff duty on psychotherapists by the time Jaffee 
reached the Supreme Court.210  Before the Court decided Jaffee, the 
Tarasoff duty existed for as long as twenty years in some states.211  
The fact that the Court did not mention Tarasoff in footnote 19 of 
Jaffee indicates that the Court was referring to an exception to the 
privilege that was not the same as the existing Tarasoff duty to make 
out-of-court disclosures.212  The Court certainly knew how to state 
that the Tarasoff duty and the dangerous patient exception were the 
same.213  The Court’s use of the phrase “the privilege must give 
way,” instead of “the right to out-of-court confidentiality must give 
way” indicates that the Court was referring to an exception that 
would allow in-court testimony.214 
B. Waiver
In regard to the psychotherapist–patient privilege, the Supreme
Court stated in Jaffee that “[l]ike other testimonial privileges, the 
209. Id. at 347.
210. See George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L. REV. 33,
47 (1999).
211. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996); see Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 334.
212. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 n.19.
213. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
214. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 n.19; see United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 995 (9th Cir.
2003) (Kleinfeld, J. concurring) (“The words ‘the privilege must give way’ do not
mean that ‘the right to out-of-court confidentiality must give way,’ or that ‘the right to
confidentiality is superseded by the duty of out-of-court disclosure to the prospective
victim.’  They mean what they say, that what must ‘give way’ is the ‘privilege.’  The
‘privilege’ is the privilege not to testify in federal court.”).
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patient may of course waive the protection.”215  This principle fully 
supports recognition of the dangerous patient exception.216 
Because of the Tarasoff duty to warn, many professional 
associations such as the American Counseling Association, the 
American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological 
Association, and the National Association of Social Workers have 
advised their members to inform patients about the limits of 
confidentiality.217  Thus, studies have shown that many 
psychotherapists advise their patients about the Tarasoff duty to 
report and that in cases where psychotherapists warned third parties, 
almost all previously discussed the duty to report with their 
patients.218  This is advisable because: 
Despite the premium placed on confidentiality within the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship, it appears that 
“[t]rust—not confidentiality—is the cornerstone of 
psychotherapy,” because “[d]isclosing information about a 
patient without knowledge or consent would be a breach of 
trust.”  Indeed, if a psychotherapist discusses his Tarasoff 
duty with a patient, it could strengthen the therapeutic 
relationship.219 
Any patient who makes threats after being warned by his 
psychotherapist that threats will be reported has waived any claim 
that the threats are privileged.220  As Wigmore clearly stated, the 
central rule for any privilege is that “communications must originate 
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.”221  For example, this 
is the case with the much older attorney–client privilege, for which 
“[i]t is vital to a claim of privilege that the communication have been 
215. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 n.14.
216. See Avoiding Liability Blog: Confidentiality and the Dangerous Patient, CPH & 
ASSOCIATES (June 2007), https://www.cphins.com/confidentiality-and-the-dangerous-
patient/ [https://perma.cc/YQM6-UUUX].
217. See Elisia Klinka, It’s Been a Privilege: Advising Patients of the Tarasoff Duty and Its
Legal Consequences for the Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 863, 890 (2009).
218. See id. at 890–91.
219. Id. at 889 (alteration in original) (quoting RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, BREACH OF
CONFIDENTIALITY, AND REPORTING DUTIES 292 (1998)).
220. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
221. WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2285.
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made and maintained in confidence.”222  “It is not enough for the 
meeting to be between a lawyer and would-be client, or that the 
meeting take place away from public view.”223 
Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly stated in Jaffee that the 
psychotherapist–patient “privilege covers confidential 
communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists 
[, and] confidential communications made to licensed social workers 
in the course of psychotherapy.”224  This “explicit confidentiality 
requirement is fatal to [any] claim of privilege” when the patient 
makes a threat after being warned that it would be disclosed because 
the patient has “no reasonable basis to conclude that the statement 
was confidential.”225   
C. Policy
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court recognized that all evidentiary
privileges “must also serv[e] public ends.”226  This policy applies to 
the spousal privilege, the psychotherapist–patient privilege, and the 
attorney–client privilege.227  Because this policy applies to all 
privileges, it is helpful to examine what the Supreme Court has said 
about the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege in 
order to understand what the Court meant in footnote 19 of Jaffee 
when it said, “[W]e do not doubt that there are situations in which the 
privilege must give way.”228 
When it comes to the attorney–client privilege, the Supreme Court 
stated in Upjohn Co. v. United States that the purpose of the privilege 
“is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and 
222. United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States
v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976)).
223. Id. (citing United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 646–47 (5th Cir. 1981)).
224. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (emphasis added).
225. United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 996 (5th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (stating that “this
case could be simply and properly resolved on the ground that by communicating
after the psychotherapist had told him she would not keep the communications secret,
appellant waived the privilege”); see also United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 589
(5th Cir. 2000) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (stating that the defendant/patient “waived any
privilege purely and simply, by continuing to threaten after he had been given notice
that his threats would not be held in confidence”).
226. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11 (alteration in original) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
227. See id. (first citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; then citing Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980)).
228. Id. at 18 n.19.
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their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice.”229  The central 
policy behind the privilege is that “sound legal advice or advocacy 
serves public ends.”230  With this in mind, the Supreme Court stated 
in United States v. Zolin that an unfettered attorney–client privilege 
does not serve public ends.231  Specifically, the Court stated: 
The attorney-client privilege must necessarily protect the 
confidences of wrongdoers, but the reason for that 
protection—the centrality of open client and attorney 
communication to the proper functioning of our adversary 
system of justice—“ceas[es] to operate at a certain point, 
namely, where the desired advice refers not to prior 
wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing.”  It is the purpose of 
the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege to 
assure that the “seal of secrecy” between lawyer and client 
does not extend to communications “made for the purpose 
of getting advice for the commission of a fraud” or crime.232 
This reason for the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client 
privilege is analogous to the reason for the dangerous patient 
exception to the psychotherapist–patient privilege.233 
To be sure, “[t]he mental health of [our] citizenry, no less than its 
physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance.”234  
However, just like the attorney–client privilege, there should also be 
an exception to the psychotherapist–patient privilege when a patient 
makes serious threats to perpetrate future violent wrongdoing on 
specific individuals, especially when those threats are carried out.235  
Protecting the life of a third party outweighs the mental health benefit 
to a patient, and this includes the need for testimony in criminal 
prosecutions.236  As the First Circuit stated when it recognized a 
crime–fraud exception to the psychotherapist–patient privilege, “we 
likewise should exclude from the privilege communications made in 
furtherance of crime or fraud because the mental health benefits, if 
229. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
230. Id.
231. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
232. Id. at 562–63 (citations omitted).
233. See infra text accompanying notes 234–41.
234. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 2 (1996).
235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
236. See infra text accompanying note 237.
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any, of protecting such communications pale in comparison to the 
‘normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining truth.’”237 
There is an additional policy consideration.238  Just as an attorney 
who witnessed their client commit a crime could not claim that they 
were exempt from testifying about it under the attorney-client 
privilege,239 a psychotherapist should likewise not be exempt from 
testifying under the psychotherapist–patient privilege when they are a 
witness to a patient making threats that constitutes a crime.240  For 
instance, because:  
[A] true threat to kill FBI agents made to a third party
constitutes [a] crime, it follows that the psychotherapist
observed the patient committing a crime in her office, just
as she would have if she had seen the patient steal her
receptionist’s purse on the way out.  As a percipient witness
to a felony, she ought to be required to testify to what she
perceived.241
D. Is There an Additional Cost to the Dangerous Patient
Exception?
The Supreme Court stated in Jaffee that the psychotherapist–patient 
privilege was needed because “disclosure of confidential 
communications made during counseling sessions may cause 
embarrassment or disgrace” and “the mere possibility of disclosure 
may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary 
for successful treatment.”242  It seems to be intuitively true that most 
people would not want embarrassing conversations to be made public 
as a general principle, but is the specific possibility of disclosure of 
threats to third parties really a deterrent to open communication?243 
When it comes to psychotherapists advising patients about their 
Tarasoff duty to report threats, “[t]here has not been extensive 
237. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)
(quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)).
238. See infra text accompanying notes 239–41.
239. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 994 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J.,
concurring).
240. See Klinka, supra note 217, at 917–18.
241. Chase, 340 F.3d at 994.
242. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
243. See infra notes 244–51 and accompanying text.
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empirical support to give credence to the deterrence hypothesis.”244  
“The empirical data that does exist suggests that only ‘a small 
minority of clients and patients would be altogether deterred from 
consulting and that perhaps a significant minority would be 
dissuaded from being completely candid during the consultation.’”245 
In fact, “studies ‘suggest that therapy is not hindered’ when 
confidentiality is breached due to a Tarasoff-required warning, ‘so 
long as a patient is involved in the decision and/or appropriately 
informed.’”246  The defendants in Hayes,247 Chase,248 and Auster249 
were all advised by their psychotherapists that threats would be 
reported, but they continued to make threats even after receiving this 
notice.250  Obviously, they were not dissuaded by the express lack of 
confidentiality.251  
But the real question is whether a dangerous patient exception 
would cause any impediment to the “confidential relationship 
necessary for successful treatment” beyond what already exists.252  
Whatever damage occurs to the psychotherapist–patient relationship 
has already occurred at the point the patient knows that threats will 
be reported to the target or the police, and has certainly occurred 
once the threats actually are reported.253  Indeed, “[i]f the possibility 
that the therapist will reveal secrets to authorities or intended victims 
has not already chilled communication between the patient and 
psychotherapist, it is not likely that the additional possibility of the 
therapist testifying in federal court would have that effect.”254 
244. Klinka, supra note 217, at 894–95 (citing EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW
WIGMORE A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 5.2.2 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002)).
245. Id. (quoting IMWINKELRIED, supra note 244, § 5.2.2).
246. Id. at 895 (quoting Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, “Where the Public Peril
Begins” 25 Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 220 (2000)); see also Joi T.
Montiel, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege as an “Occasional Instrument of
Injustice”: An Argument for a Criminal Threat Exception, 36 S. ILL. U. L. J. 445, 469
(2012) (“There is psychological literature to suggest that most patients will continue
with therapy even after being informed that their admissions of violent impulses to
their psychotherapist might be disclosed by their therapists to third parties.”).
247. United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 2000).
248. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2003).
249. United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 313 (5th Cir. 2008).
250. See supra notes 247–49 and accompanying text.
251. See Auster, 517 F.3d at 313–14; see Chase, 340 F.3d at 979–81; see Hayes, 227 F.3d
at 580–81.
252. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996); see also infra notes 253–64 and
accompanying text.
253. See Montiel, supra note 246, at 468–69.
254. Id. at 469.
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In addition, there is always the potential that a psychotherapist will 
testify against a patient for involuntary commitment purposes, as 
recognized by Chase,255 Ghane,256 and Hayes.257  The assumption is 
that the psychotherapist–patient relationship will “continue during 
the patient’s hospitalization” and, while the patient “will initially 
reject the prospect of hospitalization, it may ultimately improve his 
mental state and should not leave a stigma after the stay 
concludes.”258  However, there is no good reason to believe that the 
psychotherapist–patient relationship is too fragile to withstand 
testimony at a criminal trial but is strong enough to withstand 
testimony in a civil commitment proceeding.259  Although “there is a 
legal distinction between criminal incarceration and involuntary civil 
commitment, the nuance—in terms of trust and confidence—likely 
does not matter much to the fellow committed.”260 
In short, whatever harm disclosure causes to the psychotherapist–
patient relationship occurs long before testimony at trial.261  Any 
additional harm that may result from testimony is clearly outweighed 
by the need to protect the lives of third parties.262  Where a third 
party has actually been harmed or killed, the need for justice 
overwhelmingly outweighs any benefit of continuing therapy that 
failed to prevent the perpetration of violence.263  Thus, the Court 
should recognize the existence of the dangerous patient exception.264 
VII. PROCEDURE
In order to determine whether the dangerous patient exception
applies, a trial court should follow an organized procedure.265  
Relevant literature and caselaw provide little guidance about this 
procedure.266  The procedure that is used to determine the 
applicability of the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client 
255. See Chase, 340 F.3d at 991.
256. See United States v. Ghane, 673 F.3d 771, 786 (8th Cir. 2012).
257. See United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2000).
258. Id. at 585.
259. See United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2008).
260. Id.
261. See supra notes 252–60 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 194–263 and accompanying text.
265. See infra notes 266–78 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Part V.
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privilege should also be used to determine whether the dangerous 
patient exception applies.267 
In United States v. Zolin, the Supreme Court held that it is 
appropriate for a court to conduct an in camera review of 
communications in order to determine whether they are privileged.268  
However, the Court held that an in camera review is not automatic 
and adopted a standard that,  
Before engaging in in camera review to determine the 
applicability of the [exception to the privilege], “the judge 
should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to 
support a good faith belief by a reasonable person,” that in 
camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to 
establish the claim that the [exception to the privilege] 
applies.269 
Similarly, a party asserting that the dangerous patient exception 
applies should be required to make this same kind of prima facie 
showing that the patient made a threat to her psychotherapist, “the 
threat was serious when it was uttered[,] and . . . its disclosure was 
the only means of averting harm to the [third party] when the 
disclosure was made.”270  What matters is not whether the harm 
could be averted at the time of the testimony, but whether the harm 
could be averted only by disclosure at the time of the disclosure.271  
This is because “when the serious threat occurred that could be 
averted only by disclosure, the privilege died.”272 
In order to achieve fair results, courts should employ a procedure in 
which a prima facie showing triggers an in camera review, but does 
not end the inquiry.273  If the party invoking the dangerous patient 
exception makes the prima facie showing and the court reviews the 
psychotherapist’s testimony or records in camera, the party claiming 
the protection of the psychotherapist–patient privilege should have an 
opportunity to argue against application of the exception.274  Fairness 
267. See infra notes 268–72 and accompanying text.
268. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 557, 569 (1989).
269. Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
270. United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998).
271. See id. at 1360.
272. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 995 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
273. See United States v. Trenk, 385 F. App’x 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2010).
274. See generally id. at 258 (“Although the practice of making documents available for in
camera inspection is ‘well established’ . . . it does not deprive the party invoking the
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requires that both sides have an opportunity to argue their 
positions.275 
Another way to promote fairness is to have a different judge than 
the one presiding over the case conduct the in camera review of the 
contested testimony and materials to rule on the applicability of the 
dangerous patient exception.276  Indeed, some state and federal courts 
have encouraged in camera review by a separate judge to determine 
the applicability of the crime–fraud exception to the attorney–client 
privilege.277  This practice promotes fairness by avoiding possible 
prejudice that may result when a judge who reviews material and 
determines that it is privileged, later rules on an issue that 
information from the in camera review may affect.278 
VIII. CONCLUSION
Jaffee was decided over two decades ago, and it has been a source
of confusion and inconsistency ever since.279  The Supreme Court 
should resolve the split among the circuits by relying on the policy 
that the psychotherapist–patient privilege must only be used in a way 
that serves public ends.280  Doing so requires the recognition of the 
dangerous patient exception.281   
By the time a case gets to court and the testimony of a 
psychotherapist becomes an issue, there has, generally, already been 
a disclosure of the threats made by a dangerous patient.282  When 
threats are made after the patient was warned that any threats would 
be disclosed, any claim to privilege has been waived by the 
patient.283  Even where there has not been a waiver, any damage to 
privilege of the opportunity to contest the application of the crime-fraud exception.” 
(citations omitted)). 
275. See id. at 259 (remanding case in order to offer party an opportunity to present
arguments against the application of the crime–fraud exception).
276. See Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding the Crime-Fraud Exception to the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Immunity, 70 S.C. L. REV. 1, 30 (2018)
(“Ideally, any in camera review should be conducted by a judge other than the one
presiding over the case involving the communications.”); see also People v. Radojcic,
998 N.E.2d 1212, 1223 (Ill. 2013).
277. See People v. Radoicic, 998 N.E.2d 1212, 1223 (Ill. 2013); see In re St. Johnsbury
Trucking Co., 184 B.R. 446, 455 n.17 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995).
278. See In re Marriage of Decker, 606 N.E.2d 1094, 1107 (Ill. 1992).
279. See supra Parts IV–V.
280. See supra Parts V–VI.
281. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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the psychotherapist–patient relationship has already occurred by the 
initial disclosure to a third party and any damage from in-court 
testimony is likely to be minimal.284  Thus, any remaining benefit to 
the relationship by preventing in-court testimony is greatly 
outweighed by the public’s interest in having the jury decide the case 
based on all of the evidence.285  “The cat being already out of the 
bag, trial is no occasion for stuffing it back in.”286 
284. See supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
286. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 998 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
